New Texts Out Now: Madawi Al-Rasheed, Muted Modernists: The Struggle Over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia

New Texts Out Now: Madawi Al-Rasheed, Muted Modernists: The Struggle Over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia

New Texts Out Now: Madawi Al-Rasheed, Muted Modernists: The Struggle Over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia

By : Madawi Al-Rasheed

Madawi Al-Rasheed, Muted Modernists: The Struggle over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2015).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Madawi Al-Rasheed (MA): My interest in Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia has been ongoing for a couple of decades. The project engaging this focus started with a historical account about how the relationship gave birth to several attempts to create a state. From history, I moved to a more social science approach to look at the contemporary period. Most observers of Saudi politics assume that Wahhabiyya, the eighteenth century religious movement, was simply a pretext to establish the Al-Saud rule and grant them Islamic legitimacy. While this is taken for granted, I wanted to go beyond this and investigate how religion and state are often two totalizing regimes that do not have a smooth relationship. In a previous book, I examined the fragmentation of Wahhabiyya under state control, which led to the emergence of radical Jihadi trends, often in conflict and cooperation with the state. I identified three modus operandi between the two sides of the relationship: cooperation, appeasement and repression.

Muted Modernists was related to the Arab uprisings and their impact on Saudi Arabia. I wanted to engage with a relatively new intellectual mutation among Saudi Islamists and non-Islamists, namely the emergence of a modernist intellectual trend. This trend is labelled asrani (contemporarians), or tanwiri (enlightened). I use the term modernist to analyze the discourse and strategies of a limited number of `ulama, activists and intellectuals who are stretching the limits of interpretation of foundational Islamic texts in order to promote new thinking about politics and society.

The immediate trigger for writing the book was a very sad story. In 2012, Sulayman al-Rushoudi, an eighty-year-old human right activist and judge in Saudi Arabia, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. According to Amnesty International, “he was convicted on charges including possessing banned articles by Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed, an academic at a UK university.” I felt a strong responsibility to understand why a Salafi judge was reading my articles and I hoped that my book will contribute to documenting the struggle of many activists who became known as the Saudi Association for Civil and Political Rights (ACPRA) or HASM in Arabic.   

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MA: The book focuses on two main issues: a) the discourses that inspired the emergence of a civil and political rights movement. This included the intellectual productions of `ulama such as Salman al-Awdah and Islamist intellectuals such as Abdullah al-Hamid, and Muhamamd al-Ahmari. They were all concerned with a central question: how to establish al-dawla al-madaniyya, civil state. I also looked into the intellectual production of a younger generation of Saudi Islamist intellectuals such as Abdullah al-Maliki and Muhammad al-Abd al-Karim, both were concerned with the question of how to apply sharia and how to deconstruct the religious roots of authoritarian government. Both are critics of the Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia, although they are both a product of it.  I also wanted to map the activism of those who acted on the ideas and put them into practice. So I examined the activism of HASM and the plight of their founders and followers. By doing this I combined my intellectual history with a social scientific focus on experiences and practices.

I interviewed activists and also followed their trials in court. I found Saudi courts transformed into a theatrical performance where the discourse on human rights, civil society and democracy became strong with followers tweeting about the events and sending messages from the floor. Saudi Arabia has never seen anything like this but social media allowed this to happen. The official press had to respond and name activists and report on their trials, something that had never been on the agenda. 

I engage with the vast theoretical literature on Islamism in both the social sciences and the humanities (religious studies). I also try to critically assess the Western tradition that gave rise to the social sciences especially that which deals with religion. Our categories are sometimes not so helpful when it comes to studying Muslim society, with Islam and Muslims are still accused of being resistant to secularization. I am very skeptical about such essentialist approaches and I hope my book contributes to revising and refining such assertions.  

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MA: It was refreshing to embark on this project because I began to explore how, from within Islamic tradition, we come across serious attempts to find solutions to urgent problems that occupy people in the Arab world. My interlocutors are all a product of the Saudi Salafi-Wahhabi context, yet each one tried to infuse the tradition with modern concepts such as civil society, just government, human rights, and many other global concerns. I found a hybrid discourse that engages with Western intellectual tradition and also Arab modernist thought. While most people still believe that Saudi Arabia has only exported a radical religious tradition, namely Salafi Jihadi ideology, I found that Saudis themselves are influenced by a world intellectual heritage and history. The novelty of this research within the Saudi context was a refreshing departure from the bigoted and misogynist fatwas and opinions that I had worked on in my previous books. After writing the book, I was shocked by how threatening these modernists can be from the perspective of the Saudi government. Most of them are still in prison serving ten to fifteen years in prison, followed by bans on any travel after their release. I realized how governments oppress the most peaceful thinkers and activists, both called for peaceful mobilization, dubbed as civil Jihad, and criticized those who want to apply sharia by force after the Arab uprisings. I came to the conclusion that those modernists are more threatening than violent Jihadis, as far as government is concerned. The government does not need to justify shooting Jihadis and in fact gets the full support of society when it prevents their violence. However, peaceful activists are a different category; they provide a peaceful way out of persistent authoritarianism, and may precipitate a social movement against oppression. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MA: As all academic books, the first audience is probably the academic community of scholars and students in Middle East Studies, Religious Studies, and the social sciences. But I wrote the book in such a way to make it accessible to a wide audience, for example NGOs, policy makers, journalists and the general public. I hope the book is translated into Arabic so that it can reach an even wider audience.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MA: After the fall of several Arab presidents, some scholars began to theorize why only the Arab republics experienced severe upheavals that led to toppling presidents while monarchies are considered by some as innately immune from such upheaval. This concern increased after the Arab uprisings and started building on an earlier political science literature about the resilience of Arab monarchies. When the findings of this important literature is appropriated by Think Tank consultants and lobbyists they become hostage to other agendas, trying to project Arab monarchies, especially GCC states as islands of stability in a turbulent Arab sea. Now monarchy is reinvented as a stable, caring and not so oppressive political configuration, unlike the nasty republics of the Arab world. I want to engage in this literature and test its application on the Saudi case. I have already published working paper to see whether I am on the right path to pursue this project. 

 Excerpt from Chapter One:

The Arab uprisings pushed many reformers to start a second round of petitions, hoping that the king would respond under the pressure of the turbulence in the region.

In February 2011, several new petitions were circulated online, calling for political reform. The regime moved very quickly to censor the sites but hundreds of new young activists and old reformers whose names had been associated with previous political mobilisation rushed to circulate them and increase the number of signatories.  Three petitions were focused on political reform and youth issues, and a fourth one had obvious traditional Salafi orientation.

The first 2011 petition called ‘The Declaration of National Reform’ demanded the gradual evolution of the regime to constitutional monarchy echoing earlier petitions in 2004. The 119 signatories aspired towards a federal political system that would free the various Saudi regions from Riyadh’s centralised political and administrative control. Those who prepared the petition clearly reflected fears that in light of the Egyptian revolution, the Sunni Islamist opposition, especially that based in London and the new ones emerging in Saudi Arabia, would take the initiative and dominate the Saudi street. The petition was counted as a liberal document calling for gradual political reform.

The petition contained twelve points demanding fundamental political, economic, social and judicial reforms. It insisted on the urgency of implementing the rule of law, equality, the protection of civil and human rights, political participation, equitable development, eradication of poverty and corruption, and national election to an assembly. Most importantly, petitioners wanted a written constitution, real independent civil society, and elected local government in the provinces. While the first demand was not knew, the second indicated that in the minds of the reformers the existing organisations such as the government appointed human right associations are simply bureaucratic governmental agencies. The third demand indicated that regional autonomy is desired, especially after corruption scandals related to land development and confiscation, in addition to mismanagement of development projects led to serious flooding and deaths in several Saudi cities. In February 2011, Jeddah was the most affected by flooding resulting in rainwater and sewage creating stagnating lakes where ten people drowned and hundreds of houses were swept away. The petition concluded by asking the king to announce his intention to start political reform, release all prisoners of conscience from prison, lift the ban on travel imposed on reformers, and reinstate freedom of expression.

Immediately after this petition, a second document was released in February 2011, this time reiterating commitment to Islamic principles and without openly calling for constitutional monarchy or regional government. This petition was the work of Islamist reformers who wanted to avoid the controversial “constitutional monarchy” in order to appeal to a wider circle among those associated with the Islamic Awakening. The new petition entitled nahwa dawlat al-huquq wa al- muasasat, “Towards a State of Rights and Institutions” asked for an elected national assembly, separation between the office of king and prime minister, end to administrative corruption, freedom of speech, independent associations, release of all political prisoners, and lifting the ban on travel imposed on activists. Within days, this petition attracted over 9000 signatories, thus reflecting a growing Islamist trend that is equally calling for political reform with specific demands. The wide circle of signatories reflected a strong Islamist constituency and included famous Sahwi names such as sheikh Salman al-Awdah, judge Suleiman al-Rushoudi, Muhammad al-Ahmari and Abdullah al-Maliki, discussed later in this book. This petition was the first in Saudi recent times to move beyond important activists and reach a large number of ordinary Saudis. The petition benefitted from online activism that made it accessible to people despite government efforts to censor the sites on which it was posted. The two petitions were clearly the work of well-established activists, intellectuals and religious scholars.

However, a third call originated in 2011 among unknown youth and was certainly triggered by the Arab uprisings.  A long document entitled matalib al-shabab al-saoudi, (Demands of the Saudi Youth) attracted more than 10,000 signatories and included 14 points. This detailed petition focused on concrete economic and political demands. The youth introduced themselves as educated voices belonging to various Saudi provinces. They claimed that their demands reflect those of the majority of youth. The petition requested the government to deal with unemployment as a matter of urgency, and increase unemployment benefits to 5000SR and minimum wage to 7000SR. Housing, inflation, and supporting the private sector were considered a priority to empower the youth. On political reform, the petitioners demanded lifting the ban on independent associations, reforming the judiciary, and freeing political prisoners. They also demanded an elected national assembly that would form future governments and elected provincial local councils in ways that return local government to the people.  Empowering women, reforming the educational system and eradicating crimes that undermine social security were also mentioned.

In contrast to the above mentioned three petitions, signed by a mixture of lay reformers, religious scholars, and youth activists, a forth petition called bayan dawah lil-islah (Call for Reform), was predominantly signed by sixty five Salafi religious scholars including famous Sahwi Salafi sheikh Nasir al-Omar. The petition was framed as traditional nasiha, advice to the ruler and reminded the Saudi leadership of the pact between the founder of the first Saudi state, Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century founder of Wahhabiyya. The demands centred on fighting corruption, freeing political prisoners, dealing with unemployment, protecting property and lives, and ridding Saudi media of secularists and those who corrupt public and private morality.  Unlike the previous petitions, this overtly Salafi document does not call for major transformation of the Saudi state into a constitutional monarchy or national elections. Moreover, it is concerned with returning the Saudi polity to the original model of the first Saudi state, established in the eighteenth century and the alliance between the Wahhabi founder and the Saudi rulers. The petition clearly considers the current state to have deviated from applying sharia as it introduced new laws and decrees, all considered to have deviated from the historical Saudi-Wahhabi state model of the eighteenth century and calls upon the leadership to honour its commitment to Islamic principles.

While the above petitions and online activism were primarily concerned with local Saudi issues, regional concerns were expressed in a new document that denounced the removal of elected Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi by the military in July 2013. The petition ‘Saudi Intellectual Support for the Egyptian People’ attracted 1700 signatories. It was meant to denounce Saudi government’s alleged intervention to remove the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood from power. While the petition did not mention the Saudi government by name, it clearly stated that it denounces foreign intervention in local Egyptian affairs. After the Egyptian coup in July 2013, the Saudi government offered generous economic subsidies to the Egyptian military that ousted Morsi.

The petition started by citing Quranic verses encouraging believers to lend each other mutual support and cooperation. In this spirit, the petitioners insisted that the Saudi people respect the legitimate elected Egyptian government, denounce shedding the blood of anti-coup protestors, reject foreign governments’ intervention in Egypt, support the protestors in Rabaa Square where Muslim Brotherhood activists gathered, and condemn the suppression of freedom of speech in Egypt following the coup. After the circulation of this petition, the Saudi authorities called several Islamist activists, including well-known sheikh Muhsin al-Awaji, who was believed to be one of the main organisers of the petition, and Muhammad al-Oraifi known for his support for the ousted Egyptian government for questioning. The latter was banned from travelling to Qatar to deliver sermons and al-Awaji was released after several days in prison.

It is worth mentioning that all petitions invoked the Arab uprisings as the context that should encourage the leadership towards implementing serious political reform. With the exception of the Salafi petition and the petition concerned with Egyptian matters, the documents included a list of political and economic demands that had already been articulated in the first round of post 11 September petitions. The petitions did not call for the overthrow of the regime but they pointed to serious shortcomings and disappointment with the government. Nowhere was there a call in these petitions for peaceful demonstrations along those that had already started in Arab capitals. The authors and signatories made sure that opposition outside Saudi Arabia was not openly involved in the preparation of the documents in order to avoid direct confrontation with the regime. In private conversation with many reformists, it was clear that they refrained from taking a radical stance to avoid arrest and accusations of causing chaos and coordinating their efforts with ‘outside agents’. Signatories insisted on previous reform agendas expressed throughout 2003-8 and pledged allegiance to the Saudi king. In fact most of the activists were either well-known old veterans of reform such as Muhammad Said al-Tayib and Abdullah al-Hamid, or new shabab, young netizens, who played an important role in organising the dissemination of the petitions and publicity on Facebook and Twitter.

 

New Texts Out Now: Kishwar Rizvi, The Transnational Mosque: Architecture and Historical Memory in the Contemporary Middle East

Kishwar Rizvi, The Transnational Mosque: Architecture and Historical Memory in the Contemporary Middle East (University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Kishwar Rizvi (KR): The idea for this book emerged through my research travels in Europe and the Middle East, where I would encounter monumental mosques that looked historical in design but were built in the past thirty years. I wondered why a community of immigrant Turks in Germany, for example, chose to worship in a neo-Ottoman style mosque that appeared anachronistic and out of place (see Figure One); similarly, why were mosques in Dubai copying the Mamluk architecture of Cairo (see Figure Two)? I wanted to better understand the motivations behind these stylistic choices in which reference was being made to particular moments in Islamic history. I wanted to know what the political and ideological agendas of the states sponsoring these buildings, namely, the government of Turkey in the case of the German mosques and that of the UAE in the case of Dubai, might be.

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[Figure One: Türk Şehitlik Mosque, Berlin, Hassa Mimarlik, architects. Image via the author.]

I am an architectural historian and an architect. My focus has been on religious architecture in the early modern Islamic empires, as well as on issues of nationalism and politics in the modern Middle East. I have been interested in the manner in which the past is evoked as a source of inspiration and legitimacy, whether in Safavid Iran of the sixteenth century or in the Turkish Republic of the twentieth. Thus, when I was awarded a Carnegie Foundation Scholars Award in 2009, I wanted to understand the role played by history in the service of contemporary politics, and how it was manifested through the construction of monumental state mosques.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

KR: The book focuses on the intersection between architecture and historical memory in the contemporary Middle East. I study state-sponsored mosques to understand the political and ideological vision of four countries in particular, namely, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries represent, in many ways, divergent and complementary visions of state and society in the contemporary Middle East. I suggest that transnational mosques (defined as buildings built through government sponsorship both in the home country and abroad) provide insights into the diverse practices and beliefs of modern Islam and the nature of devotion in the twenty-first century. Their patronage, design, and production serve as important resources for understanding the role of architecture in creating public space as well as disseminating religious ideology.

The Transnational Mosque is based on extensive fieldwork, photo-documentation, and interviews with architects. Together they provide insights on several issues, foremost among them the centrality of history in the discourse on politics and Islam today; the transnational allegiances that divide and unite the Middle East and the world; and the place of architecture and the built environment in the performance of nationhood. This book builds on previous surveys of modern mosque architecture through theoretically focused and historically grounded analyses that aim to shed light on the intersection of religion and politics, and the transnational connections that it brings about.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

KR: I have written previously on nationalism and politics in the modern Middle East, with a focus on the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am interested in populist forms of religious authority and their co-option by nationalist agendas. In an earlier essay on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, I discuss the conflation of historicist shrine architecture with the symbolism of a state monument. I have also researched early modern (sixteenth-seventeenth century) architecture of Safavid Iran, in which I consider the social, historical, and urban dimensions of architecture. Then, as now, history and religion were motivating factors in imperial representation. Thus the new book builds upon my earlier work, while paying attention to subjects and sites that are new to me—namely, contemporary mosques and their transnational connections.

Religion has often been omitted from the discourse on art and architecture of the Middle East, as elsewhere, even though it is a central factor in contemporary politics and serves to both distinguish and unite communities of belief across the world. Thus The Transnational Mosque uses religious identity as a starting point to understand how countries in the Middle East construct, and export, their national image through the patronage of state mosques. I also situate these buildings within the context of architectural history and theory, positing that the roots of historicism lie in the postmodern movement, which sought to legitimize classicism as an antidote to modernism, looking at historical form for design inspiration and, often, direct imitation.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

KR: The book was written with a broad audience in mind, from architectural historians to students and scholars of the Middle East, from architects and practitioners to those interested in urbanism and cultural studies. I hope that the book is visually rich and accessible, challenging readers’ preconceptions about political allegiances in the Islamic world, and the mutability of identity in the contemporary Middle East.

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[Figure Two: Jumeirah Mosque, Dubai, Hegazy Engineering Consultants, architects. Image via the author.]

I have had the opportunity to share my work with diverse academic and design communities in the US and the Middle East, and it has been rewarding to see how people engage with the material based on their own geographical and political locations. I hope the book initiates conversations on these state monuments and their role in creating (or negating) public discourse; their centrality in national and diplomatic agendas; and their place in contemporary design practice.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

KR: A new project that extends the findings of The Transnational Mosque is on the relationship between state mosques and international museums, focusing on Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Both countries have invested a great deal of financial capital in the construction of monumental religious and cultural institutions; however, they are often viewed as distinct and unrelated. In my study, I consider the “soft power” of the museums and mosques in the construction of national identities in the Gulf as two sides of the same coin, catering to citizens as well as a global community.

Excerpt from The Transnational Mosque: Architecture and Historical Memory in the Contemporary Middle East

Transnational mosques provide insights into the diverse practices and beliefs of modern Islam and the nature of devotion in the twenty-first century. Their patronage, design, and production serve as important resources for understanding the role of architecture in creating public space as well as disseminating religious ideology. The networks within which contemporary mosques exist are more complex than ever before and need to be studied within their political and historical contexts. Their symbolic meanings and formal relationships, however unique and specific to the Muslim context, also connect them to modern architecture from other religious traditions. Contemporary mosques thus mark the underlying connections, sometimes harmonious and sometimes in conflict, within the modern Middle East in particular, but also the world at large.

In the twentieth century, architectural production in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the developing world, was predicated on emulation and engagement with Western forms of modernism, in which emphasis was laid on projects that furthered the image of statehood, such as educational and governmental buildings. Seen as derivative of movements in Europe and the United States, this architecture was often considered by scholars to be neither indigenous nor international, belonging neither to Islamic cultural history nor to the history of global modernism. Even less attention has been paid to modern religious architecture, such as mosques, shrines, and community centers, which are dismissed as catering to popular taste and undeserving of intellectual engagement. It is necessary to question these presumptions by studying the nationalist roots of early twentieth-century architecture, as well as the impact of international modernism on the built environment of the Middle East.[1] It is also important to investigate the manner in which such institutions may be viewed as forms of political and social agency.

I assert the heterogeneity of Muslim identity by focusing on distinct mosques and by revealing the complex negotiations that take place within and between nations and communities of belief. Recent scholarship has laid important groundwork for understanding the networks through which these negotiations are implemented.[2] Architectural practice at the turn of the twenty-first century, too, is one of interconnections, predicated on the itinerancy of architects and the global networks of corporate construction firms. Identities and nationalities can provide access, as is the case of the young Lebanese-American-French architect Michel Abboud, whose practice is located in New York, Beirut, and Mexico City and who was commissioned in 2010 to design the Park 51 Islamic Cultural Center and Mosque in lower Manhattan.[3] Similarly, the London-based Halcrow Group oversaw the construction of the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi. The ability for individuals as well as corporations to move beyond geographic borders and even religious ones speaks to the transnational nature of contemporary architectural culture and the mobility provided by modern technology.

The regional interconnectedness of modern architecture in the Middle East is a subject that has not received the attention it deserves. Most studies focus either on a specific nation or generalize the motivations for all Muslim communities. The study of modern mosques often falls into the latter category and, despite attempts at exhibiting diversity, results in essentialist readings of a pan-Islamic identity. The first comprehensive examination of modern mosques was published in 1997 and divides the subject into categories such as governmental and individual patronage, community and commercial institutions, and sites in Europe and the United States. One of the categories relevant to this study is that of the state mosque, which the authors, Renata Holod and Hassan Uddin Khan, define as “a building initiated by the central government and paid for by public funds. It is inevitably conceptualized by a committee with an insistence upon a clearly recognizable image, that is to say explicit in terms of regional, modernist and Islamic references.”[4] This book builds on the foundations laid by that earlier scholarship by focusing on transnational mosques built within and beyond state borders.

In the past forty years, religious identity has come to play an increasingly central role in public discourse. This is evident in the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan, but also throughout the Middle East and South Asia, where Islam is a galvanizing form of sociopolitical expression. New patrons promoting religious ideology as a source of political agency have sponsored wholesale reinterpretations of traditional building types. Similarly, greater emphasis has been laid on institutions that represent and augment Islam, such as mosques, madrasas, and community centers. Contemporary mosques employ tradition as a starting point for their design, but their styles move beyond the simple repetition of form. Not only are older motifs reinterpreted, but the very functions of a mosque are altered in order to respond to social change. A cogent example is the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara (Figure Three), a massive structure with a parking garage and shopping mall in its lower levels, which looks strikingly like Ottoman mosques built in previous centuries. However, here the patron was not a sultan but the populist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), with its appeal to a broad segment of Turkish society.

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[Figure Three: Kocatepe Mosque, Ankara, Tayla and Uluengin, architects. Image via the author.]

Architecture emerges as the repository of historical consciousness, serving as it does to both monumentalize belief and situate it within particular geographic and ideological sites. Although a building like the Kocatepe Mosque may have a singular physical location, it will arguably reference places far removed from Ankara and moments remarkably distant from its date of construction. This mobility marks contemporary architectural practice and subverts ideas of regionalism and nationalist styles that have pervaded the discourse on architecture in the twentieth century. Mosque architecture, in particular, also calls into question the common representation of Islam as a monolithic identity, shared across centuries and continents. Instead, examples of contemporary mosques require contextualization, even as they highlight the transregional and transhistorical trends that define architecture and religion today.

As current events in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate, allegiances in the Islamic world are often based on the perception of shared histories of language, ethnicity, and religion. However, the term “Middle East,” while suggesting a category of affiliations, may better be understood as an umbrella under which diverse histories, politics, and religious identities are gathered. It is useful to think of this seeming territorial designation instead as a “geopolitical concept” or a “virtual space” that serves to unite shifting social and political realities. As Michael Ezekiel Gasper writes, “The Middle East belongs to a geographic imaginary that is in part built on the general alignment of contemporary geo-strategic power. Accordingly, it will inextricably accumulate new meaning until some major strategic realignment occurs and the geographical paradigms that have been in place for more than a century give way to something new.”[5] Despite the too-simple discourse of globalization as a boundaryless web of correlations, the reality of the early twenty-first century is that identities—such as “the Middle East” or “the Islamic world”—continue to dictate how people and their governments define themselves.

Architecture, particularly that of mosques, manifests territorial as well as ideological connections by referencing historical periods and building styles and by enabling the rituals of inhabitation that augment the practice of religion. It may be argued that among the most important issues connecting—and, unfortunately, sometimes dividing—the Middle East is religious identity. While this identity is constructed and disseminated through several national and subnational means, four nations represent important, and distinct visions, for the future of the larger Muslim community, and are taking steps to advancing that agenda. Thus Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates serve as the starting points of this study. Through close analyses of their nationalist projects and their patronage of transnational mosques, valuable insights may be gleaned into not only the region’s political geography, but also its architectural landscape. Through their patronage, the dynamic mobility of form and meaning is made manifest. Rather than suggesting any predetermined flow from one to another, the mosques studied here reveal the unexpected and complex interactions between these nations and global communities of belief.

NOTES

[1] Rizvi and Isenstadt, Modernism and the Middle East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008); Rizvi, “Religious Icon and National Symbol,” Muqarnas: Journal of Islamic Art and Architecture 20 (2003): 209-224.

[2] Cooke and Lawrence, Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

[3] The program has since been changed. The current proposal calls for condominiums and a museum of Islamic art, the latter to be designed by the French architect Jean Nouvel.

[4] Holod and Khan, Mosque and the Modern World (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997); 63.

[5] Gasper, “There Is a Middle East,” in Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept, edited by Michael E. Bonine, Abbas Amanat, and Michael Ezekiel Gasper (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); 240.

[Excerpted from Kishwar Rizvi, The Transnational Mosque: Architecture and Historical Memory in the Contemporary Middle East, by permission of the author. © 2015 University of North Carolina Press. For more information, or to purchase this book, click here.]